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THE EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS 
IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE 
 
Abstract  
 
Has veterans’ preference been successful in increasing military veterans’ access to state 
and local government (SLG) jobs? U.S. Census data for 1980 through 2011 shows that veterans 
are more likely than nonveterans to work for SLGs, despite some characteristics that would 
normally make them less likely to take SLG jobs. This is especially true in states that offer 
absolute preference or pay well relative to the private sector.   
Keywords: State and Local Government, Veterans’ Preference, Workforce Diversity 
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Introduction 
With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, 2.6 million Gulf War II-era 
veterans face above-average unemployment rates1 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). To 
ease veterans’ re-entry into the civilian labor force, as well as to honor and reward their service 
to the nation, public personnel systems have made hiring veterans an important goal at least since 
World War I (U.S. Civil Service Commission 1955). State and local governments (SLGs) treat 
veterans preferentially in hiring: four states give them absolute preference – hiring qualified 
veterans ahead of more-qualified nonveterans – and the other 46 use point systems that mirror 
the traditional federal system. SLGs have been far less successful than the federal government in 
hiring veterans, however: federal employees are currently three times as likely as SLG workers 
to be veterans (Table 1). 
This article assesses how effective state and local veterans’ preference programs are in 
getting veterans access to SLG jobs. In addition to the potential implications for America’s 
commitments to our veterans, their effectiveness may also affect the diversity and quality of SLG 
workforce. Veterans are overwhelmingly male and disproportionately white, heterosexual, and 
native-born; a highly successful veterans’ preference program may lead to a less representative 
bureaucracy. Further, Lewis (2013) finds that federal employees with veterans’ preference 
advance more slowly than nonveterans hired into similar positions, implying that strong veterans’ 
preference may lower the quality of the public service, though Johnson (2014) finds that veterans 
advance just as quickly as nonveterans, once additional characteristics of entry positions are 
controlled. 
Using U.S. Census data for 1980 through 2011, this article examines whether SLGs 
employ veterans at rates higher than the private sector and tests several hypotheses to explain the 
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variation in their success. Although the veteran percentage of SLG employees is not particularly 
high, the characteristics of veterans and the desirability of SLG jobs may have more impact than 
the strength of veterans’ preference programs. First, women and minorities are more likely to 
want government jobs, but veterans are overwhelmingly male and disproportionately white.  
Second, governments tend to hire more educated employees, but veterans may be less likely than 
nonveterans to be college graduates. Thus, once individual characteristics that predict public 
sector employment are controlled, veterans may be substantially more likely than comparable 
nonveterans to work for SLGs. Third, veterans may choose not to take advantage of hiring 
preference because SLG pay is not high enough or because SLG jobs do not match their interests.  
State-level analyses therefore regress representation of veterans on the size of the SLG-private 
pay gap and the gender mix predicted by the government’s occupational composition, controlling 
for whether the state offers absolute preference and how high the veteran percentage of the 
civilian workforce is.  
The Impact of Veterans’ Preference on Employment of Veterans 
All 50 states give veterans preferential treatment in hiring. Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania and South Dakota offer absolute preference – they hire qualified veterans ahead of 
more qualified nonveterans. In Massachusetts, for instance, job applicants with passing scores 
are ranked based on their scores, but in this order: all disabled veterans, followed by all non-
disabled veterans, followed by widows and widowed mothers of veterans, followed by other 
non-veterans (Browne 1980, 1111-12).  
The other 46 states use point systems modeled on the traditional federal approach 
(Fleming and Shanor 1977; Virelli 2004). Under that approach, disabled veterans received 10-
point bonuses on 100-point federal civil service exams (or other assessments of their abilities), 
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and other qualifying2 veterans (and the spouses/widows of severely disabled/deceased veterans) 
received 5-point bonuses. Applicants with passing scores of 70 or above earned places on a civil 
service register, ranked by their scores after adding veterans’ preference. Veterans ranked ahead 
of nonveterans with the same final scores, and disabled veterans with passing scores “floated” to 
the top of the register in some cases, ahead of even non-disabled veterans with perfect scores. 
Under “the rule of three”, federal hiring officials saw only the top three applicants on their 
register, and they could “pass over” a veteran to hire a lower-ranked nonveteran only with a 
written explanation.3 Most state plans follow this general pattern, but details are difficult to 
determine, making it hard to rank the strength of veterans’ preference other than a simple 
division into absolute preference and point systems (Fleming and Shanor 1977; Virelli 2004). 
Little research examines how preference affects veterans’ probability of obtaining SLG 
jobs, but the impact at the federal level is dramatic. In the 1970s, veterans made up twice as big a 
share of the federal as of the non-federal workforce (U.S. General Accounting Office 1977). 
Blank (1985) finds that veterans are much more likely to work for government, especially at the 
federal level, than non-veterans of the same sex, race, experience level, and educational 
attainment. Sanders (2007, 412) finds that being a veteran raises the odds of a government job by 
about 40% for native-born citizens and nearly doubles them for immigrants, though he does not 
distinguish between federal and SLG patterns. Lewis (2013) finds that veterans’ odds of federal 
employment were more than four times as high as those for comparable non-veterans in 2006-9, 
but that their odds of SLG employment were only 10% to 20% higher than those for comparable 
non-veterans. 
A variety of differences between veterans and nonveterans might explain why veterans’ 
preference does not have more effect in SLGs. First, veterans might be less likely to desire public 
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sector jobs. Women, minorities, and gay men are more likely than others to want government 
jobs (Blank 1985; Borjas 2002; Lewis and Frank 2002; Lewis and Ng forthcoming), but all these 
groups tend to be under-represented in the military. Until 1967, women’s representation in the 
military was capped at 2%, and even today women make up only 14.5% of U.S. troops (CNN 
Staff  2013). Concerns that veterans’ preference discriminatorily limited women’s access to 
government jobs led to (unsuccessful) legal and political challenges to preference in the 1970s 
(Newland 1993; Browne 1980). Although President Truman began the racial desegregation of 
the military in 1948, blacks were less likely than whites to enlist until 1973. Today, 16% of the 
men and 31% of the women in the military are black (Dao 2011), but Hispanics and Asians 
remain under-represented, partly because high percentages of both groups are immigrants 
(Sanchez 2013). The military prohibited the service of homosexuals until the early 1990s 
(Berube 1990; Shilts 1993), and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” prevented the open service of lesbians 
and gay men until September 2011. Despite the ban, a higher percentage of partnered lesbians 
than of other women have served in the military, though partnered gay men are less likely than 
other men to have done so (Gates 2004). If men, whites and heterosexuals disproportionately 
benefit from veterans’ preference but have no special desire for government jobs, preference will 
have less impact on the composition of SLG work forces.  
Second, veterans might be less likely to possess certain qualifications governments are 
looking for. The public sector tends to employ better-educated, older, and more experienced 
workers (Mirvis and Hackett 1983; Blank 1985; Borjas 2002; Lewis and Oh 2008; Bender and 
Heywood 2010; Lewis and Cho 2011). Veterans, on average, are older and more experienced 
than nonveterans, which should increase their probability of public employment, but they are 
also less likely to hold bachelor’s or graduate degrees (Lewis 2013).  
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Thus, an analysis that only looks at what percentage of SLG employees are veterans may 
understate the impact of veterans’ preference if other characteristics prevent veterans from 
receiving or taking SLG jobs.  A more sophisticated analysis should look at whether veterans are 
more likely than comparable nonveterans to hold state jobs. 
A strikingly higher percentage of federal than of SLG employees are veterans, even 
though four states offer clearly stronger preferential treatment and the other 46 offer preference 
that appears comparable to the federal system. Thus, other factors may matter as much as 
veterans’ preference. First, veterans should be more likely to take advantage of preference when 
they find government jobs more desirable. Labor economists typically find that federal 
employees earn substantially more than comparably educated and experienced private sector 
workers of the same sex and race but that SLG workers typically earn about the same or less than 
they would in the private sector (Smith 1977, 1983; Long 1982; Krueger 1988; Moulton 1990; 
Belman, Franklin, and Heywood 1994; Belman and Heywood 2004; Bender and Heywood 2010; 
Gittleman and Pierce 2012). Pay disparities between comparable SLG and for-profit employers 
vary substantially across states (Belman and Heywood 1995; Kroncke and Long 1998; Llorens, 
Wenger, and Kellough 2008). If federal pay plays a large role in the over-representation of 
veterans in the federal service, then representation of veterans in SLGs should vary with their 
compensation levels. 
Second, veterans may be more likely to work for governments that offer more jobs that fit 
with their interests. In the federal service, for instance, veterans make up a far higher percentage 
of employees in the Defense Department than in domestic agencies (U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management 2011). One proxy for jobs veterans want is their gender composition. Over 90% of 
veterans are men, and occupations remain largely segregated by sex.4 In 2010, for instance, 28% 
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of SLG employees worked in occupations that were at least two-thirds female (e.g., 78% of 
elementary school teachers and 97% of secretaries were women), and 41% worked in 
occupations that were at least two-thirds male (e.g., 96% of firefighters and 85% of police 
officers were men). Only one-third worked in occupations where one sex did not outnumber the 
other more than 2-to-1. In SLGs, veterans are over-represented in more predominantly male 
occupations: they make up 8% of all employees, but 22% of police officers and 15% of 
firefighters, and only 3% of elementary school teachers and 2% of secretaries. Representation of 
veterans should be higher in states where the SLG workforce is disproportionately in 
traditionally male occupations. 
In sum, simple measures of representation of veterans in SLG may understate the impact 
of veterans’ preference, since veterans tend to possess characteristics that make them less likely 
to want or to qualify for public sector jobs.  Models that control for race, sex, education, and 
experience should provide better estimates of the effects of preference.  Further, interstate 
variation in representation of veterans can tell us more about the relative importance of veterans’ 
preference and other government characteristics in attracting veterans. In general, states with 
stronger veterans’ preference, higher pay relative to the private sector, and a more male-
dominated occupational mix should all be more successful in hiring veterans. 
Data and Research Design 
This analysis relies on data from the U.S. Census Bureau. For 1980, 1990, and 2000, it 
uses the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS). Since 2001, the Census Bureau has fielded 
the American Community Survey (ACS) annually in place of the long form of the decennial 
census, using basically the same questionnaire. The random samples are much smaller in the 
ACS than in the PUMS; therefore, the analysis combines 2009-11 ACS data to estimate patterns 
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in 2010. The sample is restricted to full-time (36+ hours per week), full-year (50+ weeks per 
year) employees, dropping both the self-employed and part-time workers. Sample sizes range 
between 2.3 and 3.5 million per year. 
To estimate how veterans’ preference affects the probability that a veteran works for an 
SLG, the analysis proceeds in three steps.  First, Table 1 reports the percentage of employees 
who are veterans in each sector (federal, state, and local governments, private for-profit 
businesses, and nonprofit organizations). It then converts these into representation ratios by 
dividing the veteran percentage in each sector by the percentage of the full-time civilian labor 
force who were veterans.  In 2010, for instance, 25.7% of federal employees and 8.1% of all 
employees were veterans. The federal representation ratio was 3.2 (25.7/8.1), implying that 
federal employees were 3.2 times as likely as full-time employees generally to be veterans. 
Ratios substantially greater than 1 indicate “over-representation” of veterans. If veterans’ 
preference increases the representation of veterans in government, representation ratios should be 
greater than one for all three levels of government and should remain reasonably stable even as 
the veteran percentage of the civilian labor force drops. 
Second, to see whether these representation ratios understate the impact of veterans’ 
preference in SLG, the next analyses examine whether veterans are more likely than 
demographically comparable nonveterans to work for SLGs. Table 2 first establishes that 
veterans and nonveterans differ substantially in sex, race, age, and educational attainment. Table 
3 then uses logit analysis to examine how veteran status affects one’s probability of working for 
a SLG, after controlling for these individual characteristics. These analyses drop federal 
employees to focus the comparison on SLG versus private sector employment. 
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In the individual-level analyses, the dependent variable (SLG) is coded 1 for those who 
work for a SLG and 0 for those employed by a for-profit firm or a nonprofit organization. The 
key independent variable (veteran) is coded 1 for those with military service and 0 for those 
with no military service.5 Aside from age, the control variables (educational attainment, sex, 
race/ethnicity, citizenship, and state of employment) are coded as sets of dummy variables, as 
shown in Table 3.    
Logit analysis assumes that the log-odds6 of employment in SLGs are a linear function of 
the independent variables which means that the probability of SLG employment is not. Thus, by 
assumption, being a veteran increases one’s log-odds of an SLG job by a fixed amount, holding 
the independent variables constant, but it increases one’s probability of SLG employment by 
different amounts, depending on one’s other characteristics. Table 4 translates the odds-ratios in 
Table 3 into probability differences, using the average partial effect (APE) approach. APE 
estimates the effect that being a veteran would have for each person in the data set, then takes the 
average of those effects (Wooldridge 2003). 
The state-level analyses examine the impact of absolute rather than point-system veterans’ 
preference, SLG-private pay differences, and occupational mix on the representation of veterans 
in SLGs.  These require several steps.  The first is to calculate two dependent variables that 
measure veterans’ and nonveterans’ relative likelihood of holding SLG jobs.  The representation 
ratio is simply the percentage of SLG employees who are veterans, divided by the percentage of 
private sector employees in the state who are veterans, calculated for each state in each year. 
Second, the odds-ratio is veterans’ odds of SLG employment relative to comparable nonveterans 
in the same state.  This requires state-by-state logit analyses comparable to those in Table 3, with 
sector of employment as the dependent variable and veteran as the key independent variable, in 
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models that control for race/ethnicity, gender, age, education, and citizenship. Table 5 reports the 
odds-ratios on the veteran variable in each state in each year. 
The second step uses state-by-state regressions to estimate the percentage difference in 
expected annual earnings between SLG and private sector employees of the same race, sex, age, 
educational level, and citizenship status, working the same number of hours in a typical week.  
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual earnings. The key independent variable 
is the dummy variable SLG, which is coded 1 for people who work for SLGs and 0 for those 
who work for private firms or nonprofit organizations. These fairly standard regressions control 
for all the independent variables in the state-level logits for SLG employment, plus the natural 
logarithm of hours worked per week fairly standard (e.g., Llorens 2008; Llorens, Wenger, and 
Kellough 2008). The coefficient on SLG is converted to a percentage pay difference by 
exponentiating it, subtracting 1, and multiplying times 100.   
The third step calculates the expected percentage male in each state’s SLG workforce, 
based on its occupational mix. This is calculated as if each occupation had a single gender 
composition regardless of the employer. For instance, if 97% of secretaries nationwide are 
women, this method expects 97% of the secretaries who work for SLGs in each state to be 
women. Thus, to calculate the expected percentage male in a state’s SLG workforce in 2010, for 
instance, the percentage of all employees in each occupation across all employers in 2010 is 
multiplied times the percentage of that state’s SLGs workers who work in that occupation.  The 
products are then summed across the 332 occupations.7 
In separate regressions for each year, the fourth step regresses the representation ratios 
and odds-ratios on the following variables, using states as the units of analysis:   
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• absolute preference is coded 1 for Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and 
South Dakota and 0 for the 46 states with point systems  
• percentage SLG-private pay difference is calculated in the second step 
• expected percentage male is calculated in step three 
• the percentage of the full-time workforce in the state who are veterans.  
Summary. If veterans’ preference increases the representation of veterans in the public 
sector: (1) representation ratios will be significantly greater than one at each level of government 
in each year and will be greater than one in SLGs in most states in most years; (2) veterans will 
be significantly more likely to work for SLGs than nonveterans with the same demographic 
characteristics; and (3) representation of veterans will be higher in states with stronger veterans’ 
preference and more desirable SLG jobs (those with higher pay and more male co-workers). 
Findings 
The number of veterans in the full-time civilian labor force has dropped steadily over the 
past three decades, from 29.5% in 1980 to 8.1% in 2010 (Table 1). Veteran representation in 
each sector dropped by about 20 percentage points, with representation always highest in the 
federal service and lowest in the nonprofit sector. The representation ratios show that veterans 
were 1.56 times as likely as nonveterans to be federal employees in 1980, and they were 3.19 
times as likely as nonveterans to be federal employees in 2010.  Representation ratios for SLGs, 
though typically above one, were never above 1.10.   
 [Table 1 about here] 
Veterans were more than twice as likely as nonveterans to work for the federal 
government in 1980 (8.6% versus 4.2%) and over four times as likely to do so in 2010 (12.4% 
versus 2.9%), but they were less likely to work for SLGs in 1980 and only slightly more likely to 
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do so in 2010 (Table 2).8 Veteran-nonveteran differences on a number of dimensions may help 
explain this.  A far higher percentage of veterans than of nonveterans are men (90.8% versus 
52.9% in 2010), though that difference has shrunk over the past thirty years (the figures were 
98.1% and 51.7% in 1980).  Veterans are also disproportionately white (75.9% versus 66.8% in 
2010).  All other race/ethnicities were under-represented among veterans in 1980, but blacks and 
those of other/mixed races now make up larger shares of veterans than nonveterans.  White, 
black, and other/mixed race men are disproportionately likely to be veterans in all years, but 
smaller percentages of veterans than of nonveterans are Latino and Asian men, presumably 
largely because large shares of these groups are immigrants. (In 2010, 17.2% of nonveterans and 
only 3.3% of veterans were immigrants.) 
[Table 2 about here] 
Educational differences were small but growing. Veterans were more likely to have 
completed high school: in 2010, they were only one-fourth as likely as nonveterans not to have 
graduated from high school (2.1% versus 8.1%).  The over-representation of immigrants among 
nonveterans exaggerates that difference; among non-immigrants, 4.6% of nonveterans and 2.0% 
of veterans did not complete high school.  In 2010, veterans were less likely than nonveterans to 
have graduated from college (28.3% versus 36.4%), but this pattern is relatively new.  In 1980, 
veterans were nearly indistinguishable from nonveterans in terms of educational attainment.  In 
both years, veterans had slightly more years of education, on average. Age, and presumably 
experience, differences are not new, however. Veterans, on average, were 7 to 8 years older than 
nonveterans in all years. 
All these characteristics have strong impacts on whether employees work for SLGs or in 
the private sector.  Table 3 shows odd-ratios from the logit models, and Table 4 converts them 
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into probability differences. Due to the huge sample sizes, all coefficients are highly significant 
and most confidence intervals are quite narrow. White women’s odds of working for SLGs, for 
instance, were 1.3 to 1.5 times the odds for white men of the same age, educational attainment, 
and citizenship status, working in the same state (Table 3), which translated into probability 
differences of 2.8 to 4.6 percentage points, when 12% to 14% of Americans worked for SLGs 
(Table 4). With the exception of Asian men (whose odds of SLG employment fell from 17% 
higher than comparable white men’s in 1980 to 18% lower in 2010), odds-ratios for all minority 
groups are substantially above one.  Compared to similar white men, for instance, black men’s 
odds of SLG employment are 1.8 to 2.1 times as high, those of black women are 2.3 to 3.1 times 
as high, and those of Latina women are almost exactly twice as high.  Interestingly, odds-ratios 
fell for most groups from 1980 to 2010.  Still, even in 2010, black women, Latinas, and black 
men were expected to be 10.6, 8.6, and 6.7 percentage points, respectively, more likely than 
comparable white men to work for SLGs. 
[Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
More educated people are far more likely to work for SLGs. The odds that employees 
with doctorates will work for an SLG are 5.1 to 6.2 times as high as the odds for comparable 
high school graduates.  Odds are twice as high for college as for high school graduates, and twice 
again as high for those with master’s degrees.  Odds for those who did not graduate high school 
were only a bit more than half as high as those for high school graduates in 2010. 
Age, experience, and immigration/citizenship status also matter.  The probability of SLG 
employment rises by one percentage point for every four or five years of age. (Sensitivity 
analyses confirm that the relationship was nearly linear in each year.) Native-born U.S. citizens 
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were the most likely to work for SLGs. Even those born abroad of American parents were 2 
percentage points, and non-citizens were nearly 10 points, less likely to do so.   
Veteran status matters less than these other factors, but its importance seems to be 
growing. The odds-ratio on veteran grew from 1.08 in 1980 to 1.21 in 2010.  That is, veterans’ 
odds of SLG employment are now 21% higher than the odds for comparable nonveterans. This 
translates into an average effect of 2.5 percentage points, up from 0.9 percentage point in 1980.  
This is about the effect of having some college rather than just a high school diploma or of being 
born in the U.S. rather than born abroad to American citizens. Controlling for differences in 
other characteristics makes SLGs look better in their efforts to hire veterans.  In 1980, veterans 
were 0.3 percentage points less likely than nonveterans to work for SLGs (Table 2) but 0.9 
percentage point more likely than comparable nonveterans to do so (Table 4).  In 2010, the 
difference is 1.2 percentage points overall and 2.5 percentage points among comparable veterans 
and nonveterans.   
State-level analyses. The states vary substantially in their representation of veterans in 
SLG workforces. Figure 1 shows that representation ratios in 2010 varied between 0.81 in West 
Virginia and 1.44 in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts (veterans were between 19% less likely 
and 44% more likely than non-veterans to work for SLGs). Table 5 shows that veterans’ odds of 
SLG employment are higher relative to nonveterans’ odds after controlling for demographic 
characteristics that affect probabilities of working for SLGs. In 2010, for instance, veterans’ odds 
of working for an SLG in Pennsylvania were 1.7 times as high as the odds for comparable 
nonveterans, and 34 of the odds-ratios were significantly greater than 1. In contrast to the 
representation ratios, only four odds-ratios in 2010 were less than 1, and three of them were 0.98. 
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Only two states had any odd-ratios significantly lower than 1 (Virginia in 1980, 1990, and 2000 
and Oklahoma in 1980). 
[Figure 1 and Table 5 about here] 
None of the representation ratios or odds-ratios comes close to those for the federal 
government, however, even though preference is sometimes stronger in SLGs. Figure 1 suggests 
that both the strength and desirability of veterans’ preference influence the representation of 
veterans. The three states with the highest representation ratios (Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, 
and New Jersey) all give veterans absolute preference in hiring. All also had odds-ratios in the 
top ten in all four years, and Pennsylvania and Massachusetts were in the top four in all four 
years. Veterans are not over-represented in the other absolute preference state, South Dakota, 
however. 
Figure 1 also shows that states vary widely in how they pay SLG employees relative to 
how the private sector in the state pays similar workers, with point estimates from 20% less in 
West Virginia to 12% more in Nevada in 2010.8 Point estimates varied substantially by both state 
and year, with the average pay disadvantage shrinking from 17% in 1980 to 9% in 2010. Because 
SLG jobs typically offer higher job security, better benefits, and more opportunities to contribute 
to society than private sector jobs do, public sector jobs are still desirable for many, even if 
salaries are lower. Nonetheless, Figure 1 shows that representation of veterans tends to be higher 
in states with higher relative pay, with those three absolute preference states still standing out for 
representation of veterans.  
Regressions using states as the units of analysis confirm this pattern (Table 6). Even 
holding constant the desirability of SLG jobs (their pay and occupational mix), panel 1 shows 
that absolute veterans’ preference raises the representation ratio by 12% to 22%.  After also 
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controlling for individual characteristics, panel 2 shows that absolute preference still raises 
veterans’ odds of SLG employment by 8% to 18% (though the effects fall short of statistical 
significance in 1980 and 2010).   
[Table 6 about here] 
When SLG jobs pay more, representation of veterans rises, suggesting they are more 
interested in taking advantage of preference.  As SLG pay rose one percent relative to pay for 
comparable employees in the for-profit sector, veterans’ representation ratio rose by 0.005 to 
0.012 (about one-half to one percent). The estimates are nearly identical when the odds-ratio is 
the dependent variable.  Holding their other characteristics constant, veterans are more likely to 
take SLG jobs when SLG pay is higher relative to the private sector.  Representation of veterans 
also tends to be higher in states where the SLG occupational distribution is weighted more 
heavily to predominantly male occupations, but that pattern has weakened substantially (the 
2010 coefficient is only one-fourth the size of the 1980 coefficient in the representation ratio 
model), and the effect of occupational mix never approaches statistical or substantive 
significance in the odds-ratio models. Representation ratios are also lower in states with more 
veterans, though this effect does not show up in the odds-ratio models until 2010.   
Low relative pay is a major reason representation of veterans in SLGs is not higher. To 
estimate the effects of veterans’ preference in the absence of a pay disadvantage to working for 
SLGs, predicted representation and odds ratios for each state in each year were generated from 
the regression models twice – once using the actual SLG pay rate and once setting SLG pay at 
100% of the pay of comparable workers in the private sector. Although 30 states had predicted 
representation ratios under 1 in 1980 (suggesting under-representation of veterans), only one 
state’s representation ratio was below 1 after assuming no SLG pay disadvantage (and it 
17 
 
 
 
was .995). In 2010, eliminating pay differences between the SLG and private sectors raised the 
average predicted representation ratio from 1.07 to 1.17 and the average predicted odds-ratio 
from 1.29 to 1.40. The “predicted RR [or OR] with equal pay” lines in Table 6 set the 
occupational mix and veteran representation in the civilian workforce to their means and set SLG 
pay at 100% of private sector pay.  Under those conditions, the predicted representation ratio 
varies between 1.10 and 1.26 in a state with a point system for veterans’ preference and between 
1.22 and 1.43 if the state awards absolute veterans’ preference. Predicted odds-ratios are higher: 
rising from 1.16 to 1.39 with a point system and from 1.28 to 1.47 with absolute preference. That 
is, in 2010, a veteran’s odds of SLG were predicted to be 39% higher than those for a nonveteran 
of the same age, educational attainment, race, and sex in states where SLG jobs paid as well as 
private sector jobs, and 47% higher if the state granted absolute preference. 
Conclusion 
Veterans’ preference gets veterans government jobs. The impact is especially strong in 
the federal sector – veterans are now more than four times as likely as nonveterans to hold 
federal jobs. Veterans are also 10% more likely than non-veterans to hold SLG jobs. 
Demographic differences mask the actual amount of over-representation: veterans’ odds of SLG 
employment are 21% higher than those of nonveterans of the same age, gender, race, and 
educational attainment.  
SLGs would employ more veterans if they paid better.  The wide variation across states 
(with 2010 representation ratios above 1.4 in five states and below 0.9 in seven) can be largely 
explained by states’ use of absolute or point-system preference and by relative SLG-private 
sector pay. Regression models predicted that, if SLG and private sector pay for comparable 
workers had been the same in every state, representation ratios would almost always have 
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exceeded 1 and would have averaged 1.17 in 2010.  Demographic differences can also explain 
almost all the under-representation. Veterans were significantly more likely than comparable 
nonveterans to hold SLG jobs in most states in each year, by 60% or more in five states in 2010; 
and across the four years, only four odds-ratios were significantly below 1. If SLG pay had 
matched private sector pay, veterans were predicted to be more likely than comparable 
nonveterans to hold SLG jobs in every state in every year, with odds that were about 40% higher 
than those for comparable nonveterans, on average in 2010.  In sum, SLGs are doing a good job 
of hiring veterans and would probably need to raise pay to do a better job.  
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Notes: 
 
1
 Overall, however, veterans are less likely than nonveterans to be unemployed. 
 
2
 To qualify for veterans’ preference in the federal service, one must have 180 or more consecutive days 
of active duty service since September 11, 2001; or between August 2, 1990 and January 2, 1992; or 
between January 31, 1955 and October 15, 1976; or between April 28, 1952 and July 1, 1955; or in World 
War II or the Cold War (between December 7, 1941 and April 28, 1952). One must also have received an 
honorable or general discharge. http://www.fedshirevets.gov/job/vetpref/index.aspx 
 
3
 Under the newer category rating system, the agency defines two or more categories of qualified 
applicants. Hiring officials can look at all applicants in the top category, but all veterans are placed ahead 
of all non-veterans within a category, and hiring officials still need approval to pass over a qualified 
veteran.  
 
4
 Economy-wide, 51% of employed women in the U.S. would have needed to change occupations in 2009 
for women to have the same occupational distribution as men; in 1980, 60% would have had to do so 
(Blau, Brummund, and Liu 2012, 40). 
 
5
 Military service does not guarantee eligibility for veterans’ preference - some periods of service do not 
qualify, and veterans with dishonorable discharges do not receive preference, for instance - but 
requirements for eligibility vary across time and states, and previous attempts to use Census data to 
distinguish between veterans who do and do not qualify for federal veterans’ preference resulted in 
unacceptably high measurement error (Lewis 2013). Combining preference-eligible and –ineligible 
veterans in the same variable will tend to understate the impact of veterans’ preference on government 
employment. 
 
6
 One’s odds of state government employment are one’s probability of holding a state job divided by 
one’s probability of holding a private sector job. In logit analysis, the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the odds (the log-odds). 
 
7
 That is, we calculate the percentage of all U.S. full-time workers in each occupation who are men. We 
then multiply those percentages times the proportion of SLG workers in each state who are in each 
occupation to generate the expected percentage male in each state’s SLG workforce. 
 
8
 The states with the most extreme pay disparities have some of the smallest samples of SLG employees, 
emphasizing the need not to assume these estimates are precise. 
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Table 1:  Representation of Veterans by Sector, 1980-2010 
 
 Percentage of Employees who are Veterans and Representation Ratios  
 
 1980 1990 2000 2010  
 
Federal government 46.0 37.9 31.4 25.7 
  (1.56) (2.07) (2.43) (3.19) 
 
Local governments 30.6 20.3 14.1 8.1 
 (1.04) (1.10) (1.09) (1.01) 
 
State governments 26.5 18.2 13.6 8.3 
 (0.90) (1.00) (1.05) (1.03) 
 
For-profit firms 28.4 17.5 12.3 7.5 
 (0.96) (0.95) (0.95) (0.93) 
 
Nonprofit organizations - 11.6 8.2 5.2   
  (0.64) (0.64) (0.64) 
 
Total 29.5 18.3 12.9 8.1 
 
*Figures in Parenthesis are representation ratios 
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Table 2. Veteran-Nonveteran Differences in 1980 and 2010 
 
 1980 2010 
 Nonveterans Veterans Nonveterans Veterans 
Sector of Employment 
Federal 4.2% 8.6% 2.9% 12.4% 
State 5.4 4.6 5.4 5.9 
Local  7.6 8.0 8.6 9.2 
SLG 12.9 12.6 13.9 15.1 
 
Gender/Race/Ethnicity 
Male 51.7 98.1 52.9 90.8 
 
White 80.8 89.1 66.8 75.9 
Black 10.6 6.6 10.7 13.3 
Latino 6.1 3.1 14.9 7.1 
Asian 1.9 0.7 5.6 1.6 
Other/Mixed 0.6 0.5 1.9 2.2 
 
White male 41.9 87.6 35.5 70.0 
White female 38.9 1.6 31.4 5.8 
Black male 4.8 6.4 4.5 11.1 
Black female 5.9 0.2 6.2 2.2 
Latino 3.7 3.0 9.0 6.4 
Latina 2.4 0.1 6.0 0.7 
Asian male 1.0 0.7 3.1 1.4 
Asian female 0.9 * 2.6 0.1 
Other/Mixed male 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.9 
Other/Mixed female 0.3 * 1.0 0.3 
 
Educational attainment  
No high school 8.5 7.2 3.1 0.4 
Some high school 12.1 12.3 5.0 1.7 
High school graduate  37.6 36.9 21.9 22.4 
Some college 22.8 23.6 33.7 47.2 
College graduate 13.6 14.2 23.4 17.9 
Master's degree 2.4 2.6 9.2 8.0 
Professional degree 1.3 1.3 2.2 1.6 
Doctorate 1.9 1.9 1.6 0.9 
 
Citizenship  
Native-born U.S. citizen  91.9 97.5 81.9 95.3 
Born abroad of American par ents 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.4 
Naturalized citizen 3.6 1.8 8.2 2.9 
Not a citizen 4.1 0.4 9.0 0.4 
 
Education in years (mean) 12.6 12.8 14.0 14.1 
Age (mean) 36.6 44.8 41.7 48.9 
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Table 3:  Odds-Ratios for SLG Employment 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Veteran 1.08 1.08 1.13 1.21 
 (14.59) (12.21) (19.12) (20.23) 
 
Gender/Race/Ethnicity (white males are reference group) 
 
White Female 1.51 1.31 1.37 1.51 
 (78.54) (53.61) (68.51) (71.68) 
Black Male 2.14 2.27 1.97 1.77 
 (88.95) (84.83) (73.95) (45.48) 
Black Female 3.09 2.75 2.53 2.30 
 (127.04) (109.75) (112.05) (79.95) 
Latino 1.49 1.64 1.47 1.28 
 (31.30) (39.14) (34.31) (19.05) 
Latina 2.01 2.04 2.04 2.01 
 (43.83) (50.77) (62.21) (57.64) 
Asian Male 1.17 1.18 0.93 0.82 
 (6.48) (7.79) (-3.89) (-9.99) 
Asian Female 1.94 1.57 1.30 1.18 
 (26.00) (20.35) (14.16) (8.89) 
Other/Mixed Male 1.92 1.77 1.34 1.49 
 (21.07) (16.37) (15.56) (16.12) 
Other/Mixed Female 2.79 2.29 1.76 1.99 
 (27.59) (23.51) (28.86) (30.14) 
 
Educational attainment (high school graduate is reference group) 
 
No high school 1.25 1.43 1.57 1.70 
 (29.82) (38.95) (42.83) (28.89) 
Some high school 1.08 1.03 0.96 0.96 
 (7.68) (1.68) (-2.11) (-1.27) 
Some college 1.73 1.91 2.20 2.23 
 (70.76) (70.44) (76.09) (44.94) 
College graduate 2.93 2.61 3.14 3.32 
 (132.66) (99.30) (107.73) (66.72) 
Master's degree 6.08 5.97 6.08 7.51 
 (160.41) (169.36) (159.77) (110.04) 
Professional degree 6.42 3.39 3.90 4.41 
 (129.74) (76.36) (88.16) (67.74) 
Doctorate 6.90 9.05 9.59 8.60 
 (155.43) (134.69) (140.00) (94.71) 
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Citizenship (native-born Americans are reference group) 
 
Born abroad of American parents 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.81 
 (-4.95) (-5.68) (-6.86) (-8.05) 
Naturalized citizen 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.62 
 (-37.97) (-40.81) (-43.65) (-42.27) 
Not a citizen 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.30 
 (-65.11) (-65.23) (-75.81) (-74.77) 
 
Age 1.017 1.025 1.024 1.019 
 (92.45) (122.11) (125.21) (86.12) 
 
Observations 2,321,584 2,720,567 3,164,390 2,170,197 
R-squared 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.059 
 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  All effects are significant at .0001 level.  Models also include 50 dummy 
variables for state of employment, and the 2010 model includes two dummy variables for survey year. 
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Table 4.  Average Partial Effects 
 
 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Veteran 0.9 1.0 1.4 2.5 
 
Gender/Race/Ethnicity 
White male [reference group] . . . . 
White Female 4.6 2.8 3.2 4.6 
Black Male 9.3 9.7 7.7 6.7 
Black Female 15.4 12.8 11.4 10.6 
Latino 4.3 5.3 4.0 2.6 
Latina 8.4 8.2 8.3 8.6 
Asian Male 1.5 1.5 -0.6 -1.7 
Asian Female 7.8 4.7 2.6 1.7 
Other/Mixed Male 7.7 6.2 2.9 4.4 
Other/Mixed Female 13.6 9.9 6.2 8.4 
 
Level of Education 
No high school -1.2 -2.3 -3.2 -3.9 
Some high school -1.8 -2.6 -3.0 -3.7 
High school graduate [reference group] . . . . 
Some college 3.4 2.6 3.0 2.6 
College graduate 10.6 6.3 7.1 7.4 
Master's degree 24.2 19.5 17.5 21.3 
Professional degree 25.4 9.8 10.1 11.5 
Doctorate 27.1 28.5 27.2 24.2 
 
Citizenship 
Native-born citizen [reference group] . . . . 
Born abroad of American parents -1.8 -1.6 -1.7 -2.5 
Naturalized citizen -4.9 -4.9 -4.4 -5.2 
Not a citizen -8.9 -7.0 -8.13 -10.2 
 
Age 0.18 0.26 0.25 0.22 
 
Observations 2,321,584 2,720,567 3,164,390 2,170,197 
R-squared 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.059 
 
All effects are significant at .0001 level.  Models also include 50 dummy variables for state of employment, and the 
2010 model includes two dummy variables for survey year. 
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Table 5. Ratio of Comparable Veterans’ to Non-veterans’ Odds of SLG Employment 
    1980  1990  2000  2010 
Pennsylvaniaa   1.21*** 1.40*** 1.63*** 1.70*** 
Nevada    1.2  1.25*** 1.34*** 1.68*** 
Massachusettsa  1.43*** 1.45*** 1.48*** 1.63*** 
Vermont    1.46**  1.20  1.27  1.63** 
California    1.28*** 1.32*** 1.38*** 1.60*** 
Hawaii    0.82  1.38*** 1.13  1.54*** 
Illinois    1.16*** 1.23*** 1.34*** 1.54*** 
Rhode Island    1.09  1.07  1.34**  1.52** 
New Jerseya   1.25*** 1.23*** 1.35*** 1.46*** 
New York    1.21*** 1.21*** 1.20*** 1.46*** 
Connecticut    1.13  1.22*** 1.35*** 1.45*** 
Florida    1.16*** 1.23*** 1.28*** 1.45*** 
Texas    1.06*  1.11*** 1.23*** 1.45*** 
Michigan    1.13*** 1.08**  1.16*** 1.42*** 
Arizona    1.13*  1.27*** 1.28*** 1.40*** 
New Hampshire   0.93  1.17  1.27**  1.39** 
Nebraska    1.01  1.15*  0.92  1.38*** 
Utah     0.91  0.99  1.11  1.36*** 
Washington    1.13**  1.26*** 1.22*** 1.36*** 
Missouri    1.04  1.22*** 1.36*** 1.35*** 
Wisconsin    1.16  1.22*** 1.16*** 1.35*** 
Oregon    1.2  1.35*** 1.26*** 1.34*** 
Louisiana    1.00  0.99  1.09  1.32*** 
Colorado    1.07  1.11*  1.15*** 1.31*** 
Minnesota    1.07  1.32*** 1.28*** 1.27*** 
Georgia    1.05  1.12*** 1.23*** 1.26*** 
Kansas    0.90  1.23*** 1.17**  1.26** 
North Carolina   1.00  1.03  1.11*** 1.26*** 
Kentucky    1.01  1.00  1.03  1.23** 
Ohio     1.05  1.09*** 1.19*** 1.23*** 
Delaware    1.09  1.22*  1.46*** 1.22 
Oklahoma    0.87*  1.09  1.06  1.21** 
South Dakotaa   0.90  1.04  1.13  1.21 
Tennessee    1.05  1.12**  1.05  1.21*** 
Iowa     1.13  1.31*** 1.05  1.16 
Maryland    0.95  0.97  1.09**  1.16** 
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Montana    0.96  1.01  1.38*** 1.15 
Idaho     1.31**  1.27**  1.16  1.13 
Indiana    0.99  1.07  1.14*** 1.13 
Alabama    1.04  1.06  1.11*  1.12 
Wyoming    1.27  1.06  1.34**  1.12 
North Dakota    0.87  1.09  1.35**  1.09 
South Carolina   1.01  1.00  1.17**  1.07 
New Mexico    0.9  1.11  1.13  1.03 
Maine    0.96  1.26**  1.17  1.02 
West Virginia    0.74  0.96  1.20**  1.01 
Arkansas    0.90  1.09  1.03  0.98 
Mississippi    1.04  0.95  1.08  0.98 
Virginia    0.90*  0.93*  0.89*** 0.98 
Alaska    1.04  1.28**  1.28**  0.82 
     
a  State has absolute veterans’ preference during some periods.    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
     
Numbers are odds-ratios on veteran variable. Logit models are run separately by state and year; all control for race 
and sex (9 dummy variables), education (23 dummy variables), and age (45 dummy variables). Figures for 2010 
actually combine data for 2009 through 2010. States are ranked by size of odds-ratio in 2010.   
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Table 6. Predictors of Veterans’ Representation  
 
Representation Ratio 1980 1990 2000 2010 
 
Absolute preference  0.118** 0.169*** 0.223*** 0.157*** 
 (2.46) (3.64) (4.61) (2.71) 
 
SLG pay as percentage of  0.007*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
   private sector pay (3.62) (6.13) (3.34) (4.35) 
 
Occupational mix 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.015* 0.007 
   (Expected percent male) (4.28) (3.04) (2.00) (0.77) 
 
Veteran percentage -0.012** -0.020*** -0.014** -0.033*** 
 of state civilian workforce (2.07) (3.53) (2.20) (3.39) 
 
R-squared 0.57 0.69 0.64 0.66 
Predicted RR with equal pay and 
    points for veterans’ preference 1.10 1.26 1.18 1.15 
    absolute preference 1.22 1.43 1.40 1.31 
 
Odds-Ratio 1980 1990 2000 2010 
 
Absolute preference  0.118 0.133** 0.177** 0.0758 
 (1.64) (2.29) (2.41) (0.94) 
 
SLG pay as percentage of  0.007** 0.011*** 0.005* 0.0127*** 
   private sector pay (2.34) (4.20) (1.68) (3.55) 
 
Occupational mix 0.006 -0.011 -0.002 -0.006 
   (Expected percent male) (0.54) (1.19) (0.15) (0.48) 
 
Veteran percentage 0.009 0.012 0.002 -0.049*** 
 of state civilian workforce (1.01) (1.61) (0.19) (3.67) 
 
R-squared 0.22 0.35 0.21 0.54 
Predicted RR with equal pay and 
    points for veterans’ preference 1.16 1.28 1.25 1.39 
    absolute preference 1.28 1.41 1.43 1.47 
 
Observations 51 51 51 51 
t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Figure 1. SLG-Private Wage Advantage and Representation of Veterans 
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